### IMF 2013 - 7th International Conference on IT Security Incident Management & IT Forensics

## "Anti-Forensics: The Next Step in Digital Forensics Tool Testing"



Felix Freiling, Christian Moch, Martin Wundram

Image source: mpavlov / Clipdealer

## Agenda

- I. What is Anti-Forensics?
- **II.Examples for Anti-Forensics**
- **III.**Catagorization of actions in Anti-Forensics
- IV.Anti-Anti-Forensics: What can we do?
- V.Lessons learned
- VI. Questions?

# **Greetings**

#### About the authors

- Martin Wundram, TronicGuard GmbH, Cologne:
  - Focus on IT-Security and IT-Forensics, e.g. web security, penetration testing, ISO/IEC 27001, ediscovery
  - Entitled by the chamber of commerce of Cologne as an officially approved and sworn in expert witness for systems and applications in information processing (Von der IHK zu Köln öffentlich bestellter und vereidigter Sachverständiger für Systeme und Anwendungen der Informationsverarbeitung)
- Felix Freiling, Friedrich-Alexander-University, Erlangen
- Christian Moch, Friedrich-Alexander-University, Erlangen

# **Greetings**

#### About the topic/paper

- How about combining IT security and IT forensics? How about stress testing and attacking IT forensics tools?
- Are they as robust and reliable as We assume?
- First talk 2011 at 28C3 in Berlin (Chaos Communication Congress by Chaos Computer Club)
- Previous work by others (two examples):
  - "Arriving at an anti-forensics consensus: Examining how to define and control the anti-forensics problem", Ryan Harris, 2006
  - "Counter Forensics", Noemi Kuncik und Andy Harbison, Digital Forensics Magazine, 2010
    - Data Destruction, File Deletion, Re-Formatting, Defragmentation

### Storytelling



### **Storytelling – Conclusion**



- Not new at all: IT forensics can be a complex task, while dealing with large or huge amounts of data one can easily overlook important facts
- Also not new: anti forensics is possible with simple or even very simple methods.
- Anti anti forensic in this case wasn't that simple, but doable with standard forensics tools (intensive search for deleted data, +abnormalities in filenames and timestemps). You could have overlooked important details easily.
- A secure deletion of data could possibly prevent an elucidation of this case.

### Storytelling



Image source: treenabeena - Fotolia.com

### Storytelling – Conclusion



- IT forensics software helps us
  - to be more efficient (how to examine e.g. 4 TB of data?)
  - to be more effective (how to understand and interpret the database structure in that shiny new instant messenger?)
- Involved parties tend to rely on the tools outcome
  - Forensics software has a leading portion at the extraction and evaluation of findings from certain issues
- But IT forensics software is just that: software which can produce wrong results
- At court upraising of general doubts on the results/correctnes of your tool can be impossible to defute. Although your software in that case probably has produced correct and complete results

### Definition

"[...]any attempts to compromise the availability or usefulness of evidence to the forensics process.[...]" (based on definition by Ryan Harris)

- There are three essential classes of methods:
  - Data prevention and concealment
  - Elimination of data (possibly unnoticeable)
  - and active attacks (often causing noticeable irregularities).
- In this talk: focus on attacks on forensics tools

### Points of attack in IT forensics processes

- Simplified process view:
  - Identification  $\rightarrow$  Seizure  $\rightarrow$  Analysis  $\rightarrow$  Presentation
- Possible target resources:
  - Evidence
  - Tools
  - experts in IT forensics

#### Points of attack in IT-forensics processes

- Some examplary questions from the examiners point of view:
  - Is every action documented and comprehensible?
  - Is the enemy partially more experienced then the expert in IT forensics?
  - Is there anything unsuspicious that wasn't further reviewed?
  - Was a pressure of time cause of a prevention to work thoroughly? Were there any distractions?
  - Was the evaluation system connected to the internet or to an internal network?

#### When and why to make use of Anti-Forensics

- From an attackers point of view: when there is an assumption, that relevant systems could be investigated in the future:
  - Cracker obliterates traces of intrusion
  - Downloader conceals traces of downloads
  - Registry cleaner and disk wiper to clear traces of e.g. the creation of a fake invoice
  - Person encrypts personal data
  - $\rightarrow$  Thats well known
  - New: direct attacks against forensic tools!
    - "Poison" your system and let the "virus" sleep until a forensic examiner inspects your system/data and gets infected

### **Critical XSS vulnerability in X-Ways Forensics**

- Widespread in Germany and other countrys
- All in all good and valuable software
- A now fixed, but serious problem:
  - XSS classic, after Artur Janc "Resident XSS"
  - HTML/Javascript Code can be inserted into a suspects registry, then resides there "silently" waiting for its victim
  - X-Ways tranfers this code into its own HTML reports
  - Results:
    - Hiding of evidence
    - Adding fake evidence
    - Attack the examiners host computer and other systems

#### **Critical XSS vulnerability in X-Ways Forensics**

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#### "Self anti forensics"

- Product A: ~30% of the Firefox history (SQLite-DB!) were not observed/examined
- Product B: "Error 42 in Component XY at analysing the MFT. Press OK to continue" → a lot of data was not presented, including an Outlook .PST with exculpatory evidence!
- Product C (Live Forensics Tool): reproducable crash while saving DNS cache, no further analysis possible → tool was completely unusable in that specific case

### Anti-Anti-Forensics: What can we do?

#### Lockdown every user of Anti-Forensics and every knowledge about it!



Image source: YuriArcurs / Clipdealer

# Anti-Anti-Forensics: What can we do?

#### **Building awareness**

Experts in IT forensics have to deal with anti-forensics, because:

- Criminals already do it
- IT forensics and IT security coming closer
- Live forensics becoming more important, growing number of cases with "only one try"
- Every scenario ist hypothetical until it comes true
- Forensic software could create false results even without external influences
- It is always good to be prepared!

## Anti-Anti-Forensics: What can we do ?

#### Time, ressources and better software

#### More reliable and precise software

- Development of **more robust** tools
- Make irregularities clearly visible, more debug information
- Check routines, which check and warn for known anti-forensics issues and other abnormalities
- Heuristics, which can defuse certain attacks
- Forensics software should not just be checked for the capability of finding evidence, but also for the reliability and robustness of the software itself!

## Anti-Anti-Forensics: What can we do?

From an academic perspective

- Acquire more knowledge about raw data and artefacts
- Less focus on specific tools and their handling
- Don't encourage or promote magic-button "nintendo forensics"

### Lessons learned, future work?

- IT forensics in relation to IT security rather "uncemented"
- Old stuff (XSS) coming back and shining again
- The demands on correct methods and correct results are very high
- Little problems can cause fatal results (exculpatory file overseen?)
- Probably lots of weaknesses in forensics software have not been found yet...
- Experts in IT forensics and software developers have to work more carefully and with more awareness

## Lessons learned, future work?

- Forensic Tool Testing (Computer Forensics Tool Testing NIST)
- Further research: evaluate more tools in a more thoroughly manner with broader and deeper simulated attacks
- Develop a clear taxonomy and a systematic catalogue of testing scenarios and methods
- Training station for simulated cases of live forensics
  - A specially prepared Linux system (hidden anti-forensics kernel module)
  - Several traps which will perform typical and new techniques in anti-forensics
  - Our aim: gain a better insight from an examiners perspective and build up routine

# **Questions? / Contact**

### **Questions? Hints? :-)**

- Thank you!
- Contact:
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